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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDS A CITIZEN'S

RIGHT TO FILM A POLICE OFFICER DURING A
TRAFFIC STOP ABSENT A REASONABLE
RESTRICTION-GERICKE V BEGIN, 753 F.3D 1
(1ST CIR. 2014).
When a person acting under color of state law deprives a citizen of
his federal constitutional rights, that citizen will have a remedy under
Section 1983.1 In recent years, there have been a growing number of
citizens alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights and bringing
actions under § 1983 after suffering prosecution seemingly in retaliation for
filming or recording police officers. 2 In Gericke v. Begin,3 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals considered whether plaintiff, Carla Gericke, was
exercising a clearly established constitutional right when she filmed a
police officer during a traffic stop. 4 The First Circuit held an individual has
a clearly established First Amendment right to record a police officer
during a traffic stop, unless a reasonable restriction has been imposed on
his right to record.5
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on March 24, 2010, Gericke was in
her vehicle in Weare, New Hampshire following Tyler Hanslin to Hanslin's
residence when Weare police Sergeant Joseph Kelley pulled behind
Gericke's vehicle and activated his emergency lights.6 In response, Hanslin
and Gericke both pulled to the side of the road and Sergeant Kelley pulled
between the vehicles; Kelley then informed Gericke that he was only

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.").
2 See Eric M. Larsson, Criminal and Civil Liability of Civilians and Police Officers
ConcerningRecording of PoliceActions, 84 A.L.R.6th 89 (2013).
3 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014).
4 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 5.
5 See id. at 10 (concluding no police order to stop filming so filing wiretapping charge
violated First Amendment rights).
6 See id. at 3 (detailing events leading to case).
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detaining Hanslin and she should move her vehicle . While Gericke was
moving her vehicle to the adjacent Weare Middle School parking lot,
Kelley approached Hanslin's vehicle and inquired about the presence of
weapons; Hanslin replied that he was in fact armed with a handgun.8 After
Gericke parked, she exited her vehicle and announced to Sergeant Kelley
she was going to audio-video record him. 9 Gericke then proceeded to point
a video camera at Sergeant Kelley in an attempt to film Kelley's
interactions with Hanslin. 10 Under Gericke's version of the facts, Sergeant
Kelley never asked Gericke to stop recording and he did not give her any
type of order to leave the area."
As the stop continued, Gericke eventually stopped holding up the
camera and placed it in the center console of her vehicle.' 2 At this point,
Officer Brandon Montplaisir approached Gericke's vehicle and demanded
the camera's location; however Gericke refused to respond to his
requests. 3 Montplaisir then arrested Gericke for disobeying a police order
and Gericke was subsequently transported to the Weare Police Station
where she was charged with disobeying a police officer and unlawful
interception of oral communications. 4
In May 2011, Gericke brought an action against the officers and
town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her First Amendment rights
were violated when she was charged with illegal wiretapping for recording
the traffic stop. 15 In the district court, the defendant officers asserted that
they were entitled to qualified immunity, however the court ruled that
further development of the facts was necessary in order to decide the
qualified immunity question. 16 While the district court recognized that
7 See id.

8 Id. Hanslin was properly licensed to carry the firearm and at no time during the encounter
did Sergeant Kelley draw his own weapon. Id. at 3 n.1.
9 Gericke, 753 F.3d at 3.
10 See id. (noting Gericke attempted to record Sergeant Kelley but could not get camera to
record). Notwithstanding, the parties did not feel that her camera's malfunction was relevant to
the larger underlying issues in the case. Id. at 3 n.2. The court agreed and stated, "Gericke's First
Amendment right does not depend on whether her attempt to videotape was frustrated by a
technical malfunction." Id.
11 See id. at 3. The defendant-officers agreed to accept Gericke's "best case" version of the
facts in order to test the qualified immunity issue on appeal. Id. at 5.
12 See id. at 3.
13 See id. at 3-4. Gericke also refused to give the officer her license and registration. Id. at 4.
14 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 4. At a probable cause hearing the town prosecutor declined to
proceed on any of Gericke's pending charges and upon referral the Hillsborough County Attorney
similarly declined to prosecute. See id.
15 See id. (discussing procedural history).
16 See id. at 4-5.
See generally infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing
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there was a right to peacefully film a police officer performing her official
duties in public, it concluded that there was no clearly established right to
record an officer in a disruptive manner. 17 The district court held that there
was a genuine factual dispute about whether Gericke was disruptive, the
court accordingly denied the officers' motion for summary judgment.' 8 In
response, the officers filed a timely interlocutory appeal to test the qualified
immunity issue. 19 Upon review, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time
of the traffic stop it was clearly established that Gericke had a right to
peaceably record the officers so long as no reasonable restriction was
imposed or in place.2 0
State and local police officers who act under color of state law and

deprive a citizen's federal statutory or constitutional rights can be sued
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 § 1983, which is a federal statutory
remedy for the violation of constitutional rights. 2z However, liability under
§ 1983 is not absolute, and while different immunity defenses do exist, the
defense of qualified immunity is the most frequently utilized and presents
the most complicated problems for plaintiffs attempting to bring successful
§ 1983 actions.2 2 Qualified immunity is a defense for officials who make
reasonable, but mistaken, judgments that lead to constitutional
deprivations.2 3
When conducting a qualified immunity analysis a

qualified immunity).
17 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 5 (summarizing district court's findings).
" See id.
19 See id. at 5 (outlining basis for defendants' appeal). The First Circuit refused to hear the
interlocutory appeal if there was a disputed factual question, e.g., Gericke being disruptive, so the
officers agreed to accept Gericke's "best case" version of the facts in order to test the qualified
immunity issue. See id.
20 See id. at 10 (upholding citizen's right to peacefully record police officers).
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (discussing actors under color of law found depriving rights
are liable to injured party). Section 1983 actions are in a sense "constitutional torts" and require a
deprivation of a citizen's federal rights by a person acting under color of state law. See James J.
Park, The ConstitutionalTortAction as IndividualRemedy, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 393
n. 1 (2003) (characterizing 1983 actions against state and federal officials as constitutional torts).
22 See Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of QualifiedImmunity: Summary Judgment and the Role
ofFacts in ConstitutionalTort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1997) (discussing absolute and
qualified immunity doctrines). Chen notes that absolute immunity covers only a limited class of
officials, such as legislators, judges, and prosecutors. See id. at 12. Qualified immunity covers
the "vast remainder of officials, who compromise the most substantial segment of the public
sector .
Id. at 13; see MICHAEL AVERY, DAVID RUDOVSKY & KAREN M. BLUM, POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION, § 3:4 (3d ed. 2014) (noting qualified immunity is
significant and problematic defense to civil rights litigation).
23 See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) ("Qualified immunity gives
government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open
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reviewing court will ask the following two questions: (1) do the facts
alleged by the plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional right; and if
so, (2) was that constitutional right clearly established at the time the
alleged conduct occurred.24
A constitutional right will be clearly

established where, "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear [such]
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right., 25 When analyzing the clearly established prong, courts compare

prior case law with the facts of the case at hand to determine whether a
reasonable official would know he is a violating a right; it is therefore
critical to determine the source of law that will put an official on notice and

legal questions."); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) ("Qualified immunity shields
an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably
misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted."); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986) ("[Q]ualified immunity ...
provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."); see also Chen, supra note 22, at 14
(discussing Supreme Court's policy rationales for qualified immunity doctrine). First, the Court
has identified fairness as a rationale for qualified immunity doctrine because in some cases it may
be unfair to subject government officials to liability for discretionary decisions that are often
made in light of unclear constitutional law. See Chen, supra note 22, at 14. Second, public
officials may fear committing constitutional violations and this may also interfere with the
performance of public duties and decision-making; ideally the defense of qualified immunity
would remove this impediment by reassuring public officials that even mistaken decisions will
not often result in liability. See id.Lastly, Chen explains that the Court has advanced the "social
costs" argument, which posits that many constitutional tort claims are frivolous, and qualified
immunity saves public officials and society in general, from the time and expense of defending
against such frivolity. See id.
24 See Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2080 (outlining qualified immunity analysis); Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232-33 (2009) (explaining flexible, two pronged approach to qualified
immunity). In Pearson, the Court overruled prior case law and held that reviewing courts no
longer have to engage in a mandatory two step qualified immunity analysis. Pearson,555 U.S. at
236. Prior case law mandated a two-step approach to the analysis, whereby the first prong needed
to be satisfied before moving to the second. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(requiring mandatory two-step approach). In the wake of Pearson, courts remain free to conduct
the two-step inquiry, but courts may also jump directly to the second prong and thus avoid the
larger constitutional question that is often presented at the first step. See Pearson, 555. U.S. at
236 (noting Saucier test no longer mandatory and courts can apply prongs in light of
circumstances); see also Karen M. Blum, QualifiedImmunity: FurtherDevelopments in the PostPearson Era, 27 TOURO L. REv. 243, 248 (2011) (explaining most courts move directly to second
prong without deciding whether constitutional violation exists).
25 Andersonv. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [are] generally shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate [a] clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). But see AlKidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (adding law clearly established when every reasonable official
understands his conduct violates constitutional right) (emphasis added); Karen Blum, Erwin
Chemerinsky & Martin Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for
Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REv. 633, 655 (2013) (noting "every reasonable official" language of AlKidd creates more stringent "clearly established" law test) (emphasis added).
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the level of generality with which the reviewing court will frame the
underlying right.26
There are many types of § 1983 actions, particularly because
technology has developed and electronic devices with recording
capabilities have become increasingly ubiquitous forcing courts to deal
with § 1983 actions brought by citizens who claim officers have been
retaliating against citizens for recording officers in public areas.27 Almost
invariably, these cases present situations where a citizen is charged with a

26

See Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 25, at 652-53 (highlighting sources of

law courts look to). The authors state that Supreme Court decisions, controlling circuit authority,
or a consensus of persuasive authority from other circuits are three sources of law that can make
the law clearly established. See id But see Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006)
(reasoning law not clearly established when neither Second Circuit nor Supreme Court had
recognized such); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003)
("[O]nly Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and Georgia Supreme Court caselaw
can 'clearly establish' law in this circuit."). Although the Supreme Court has not provided
definitive guidance on the clearly established standard, it has criticized and reversed lower courts
for framing the right too narrowly and too broadly. See Blum, Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra
note 25, at 653 -56 (highlighting difficulty determining what is sufficient to put officials on notice
their conduct is unconstitutional). At one end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court has instructed
reviewing courts to take notice of the particular facts at issue in the case and frame the right in a
more particularized and narrow sense. See id At the other end of the spectrum, the Supreme
Court has suggested a more liberal approach by stating that fair notice about the
unconstitutionality of the conduct is all that is required to make the law clearly established. See
id. Indeed, the Court has rejected the proposition that fair notice requires a prior case that is
directly on point with the official's challenged conduct. See id Compare Saucier, 533 U.S. at
200 ("[T]he question [of] whether the right was clearly established must be considered on a more
specific level than recognized by the Court of Appeals.") (emphasis added), and Brosseau, 543
U.S. at 199-200 ("We ...ask whether, at the time of Brosseau's actions, it was 'clearly
established' in this more 'particularized' sense that she was violating Haugen's Fourth
Amendment right."), with Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002) (holding fair warning of
unconstitutional conduct all that is necessary to make law clearly established).
27 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (deciding citizen had First
Amendment right to film police officers in public park); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding right to film officer during traffic stop was not clearly
established); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing
citizens have First Amendment right to "photograph or videotape police conduct"); Fordyce v.
City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding officer could be liable for assaulting
citizen videotaping protest march); Justin Welply, Comment, When, Where and Why the First
Amendment Protects the Right to Record Police Communications: A Substantial Interference
Guidelinefor Determining the Scope of the Right to Record andfor Revamping Restrictive State
Wiretapping Laws, 57 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1085, 1100-06 (2013) (outlining older and newer cases
that involve citizens recording police officers). Additionally, courts have also held individuals
have the right to record officers from private property. See Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d
24, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding activist had First Amendment protection after recording police
conducting warrantless search of private residence); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534,
541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding citizen had First Amendment right to film officers from private
property).
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violation of a state wiretapping statute after recording some type of
encounter with police. 28 In the face of significant criticism from academia
and increasing disdain from courts, police officers have nevertheless used
these statutes and other general laws with growing frequency to prosecute
citizens who have recorded police activity. 29 However, many officers have
faced liability because retaliation against a person who is exercising her
First Amendment rights has long been recognized as a cognizable claim
under § 1983.3 o
As with any nascent issue of law, the use of wiretapping statutes to
prosecute individuals who record police officers has created some
confusion in the courts over the scope of the right, as well as some division
28 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 80 (explaining Glik charged with violating wiretap statute after

recording officers on Boston Common conducting arrest); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438 (describing
plaintiff charged with violating Washington wiretap statute); Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police
Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve
the Civilian's Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 489-511
(2011) (collecting and analyzing federal and state wiretapping statutes); Marianne F. Kies, Note,
Policing the Police: Freedom of the Press, the Right to Privacy, and Civilian Recordings of
Police Activity, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 274, 278-90 (2011) (explaining legal history behind
wiretapping statutes and statutes' usage against citizens); Andrew Martinez Whitson, Note, The
Need for Additional Safeguards Against Racist Police Practices: A Call for Change to
Massachusetts & Illinois Wiretapping Laws, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 200 (2014)
(discussing expanded use of wiretapping statutes against citizens who record police); see also
David Murphy, Comment, "VLP. " VideographerIntimidationProtection: How the Government
Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape the Police, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 333-34 (2013)
(noting that police may choose to charge citizens with violations of other general laws). In
addition to wiretapping statutes, the author lists obstruction of justice and failure to disobey a
police order as two examples of alternative charges that police could use against citizens who
record police officers. See Murphy, supra.
29 See ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (enjoining enforcement of
Illinois eavesdropping statute on First Amendment grounds); Taylor Robertson, Lights, Camera,
Arrest: The Stage is Set for a FederalResolution of a Citizen's Right to Record the Police in
Public, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 117, 139 (2014) (criticizing wiretapping statutes against citizens
who record police and calling for uniform federal rule); Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining
Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers' Power, 117
YALE L.J. 1549, 1553 (2008) (urging states to amend wiretapping laws and allow citizens to
record police under certain circumstances); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who Watches the Watchmen2
Big Brother's Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDozo L. REV. 389,
422 (2012) (proposing solutions for improper arrest of citizens who record police).
30 See AVERY, RUDOVSKY & BLUM, supra note 22, at § 2:16 (explaining that § 1983 actions
can serve as remedy for retaliatory prosecutions); see also Colin P. Watson, Note, Limiting a
ConstitutionalTort Without ProbableCause: FirstAmendment RetaliatoryArrest After Hartman,
107 MICH. L. REV. 111, 111 (2008) (explaining federal law remedy for citizens who face
retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights). The author explains that plaintiffs alleging a
retaliation claim must plead and prove the following three elements: (1) the existence of a First
Amendment right; (2) that the exercise of the right was a substantial motivating factor in the
government official's decision to take adverse retaliatory action; and (3) that the adverse action
chilled the exercise of the citizen's right. See Watson, supra, at 114.
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over whether the right is clearly established when considered in the context
of novel factual situations. 3' In the leading decision of Glik v. Cunniffe, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals held that plaintiff Simon Glik had a clearly
established right to film police officers who were making an arrest on the
Boston Common.3 2 However, the First Circuit qualified this right to record
by stating the right is not absolute, and that it could be limited by
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.3 3 Importantly, the court
noted the peaceful nature of Glik's recording, and reasoned that Glik's
right to record remained unfettered because he recorded from a
"comfortable remove", and did not interfere or molest the officers in any
way.34 The First Circuit also distinguished Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a

31 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding plaintiff had clearly

established right to film officers on Boston Common); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding right to film officer not clearly established in context of traffic
stop); see also Bleish v. Moriarty, No. 11-cv-162-LM, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 2752188, at *14 (D.
N.H. July 9, 2012) (granting officers sumnary judgment because arrest was not related to
suspect's First Amendment activities). The Bleish court noted officers in this case said nothing
about Bleish's First Amendment rights while arresting her and the officers even passed her
camera to other demonstrators for safekeeping. Bleish, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 2752188, at *11.
Additionally, the court highlighted the fact that Bleish was recording the officers from a distance
of one or two feet and even stuck her camera in an officer's face and inside a police cruiser. See
id at *13. Bleish also spoke to officers in a loud tone from a short distance away while the
officers were attempting to arrest another demonstrator, and the court seemed to disapprove of the
distraction that this created. See id; see also Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., No. 09-1070,
2010 U.S. Dist. WL 1007859, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) ("[I]n light of the existing law as of
April 29, 2009 ... the purported First Amendment right to record the police was not 'clearly
established."'). But see Jesse Harlan Alderman, Before You Press Record: Unanswered
Questions Surrounding The FirstAmendment Right To Film Public Police Activity, 33 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 485, 533 (2013) (arguing robust consensus of persuasive authority makes right to record
clearly established).
32 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 79 ("We conclude, based on the facts alleged, that Glik was
exercising clearly-established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a public space,
and that his clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without
probable cause. We therefore affirm."); see also Caycee Hampton, Case Comment, Confirmation
of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and the Paradoxof Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1549,
1552-1557 (2011) (discussing and analyzing implications of Glik decision); Jane T. Haviland,
Case Comment, Constituional Law First Circuit Protects Right to Record Public Officials
DischargingDuties in Public Space Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F 3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011), 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 1329, 1329-32 (2012) (explaining facts of Glik case).
" See Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 ("[T]o be sure, the right to film is not without limitations. It may
be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.").
34 See id. ("[T]he complaint indicates that Glik 'filmed [the officers] from a comfortable
remove' and 'neither spoke to nor molested them in any way' (except in directly responding to
the officers when they addressed him). Such peaceful recording of an arrest in a public space that
does not interfere with the police officers' performance of their duties is not reasonably subject to
limitation.") (citation omitted); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987)
(stressing importance of individual's right to criticize and challenge police action).
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case in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held the right to film a
police officer during a traffic stop was not clearly established.35 Although
Glik answered several important questions, its holding was limited by the
court's own qualifications and the relatively non-controversial facts of that
36
case.

In Gericke v. Begin, the First Circuit again took up the issue of a
citizen's right to record the police and ultimately reaffirmed that right in
the context of a traffic stop. 37 Notably, the case came to the First Circuit
through an interlocutory appeal and the officers agreed to accept Gericke's
"best case" version of the facts in order to test the qualified immunity
issue. 38 Turning to the first prong of the analysis, the court reasoned an
individual has a constitutional right to film traffic stops because traffic
stops are a police duty carried out in public, and a citizen's ability to film
police in such a setting serves significant First Amendment objectives.39
However, the court was quick to point out that the right to film a traffic
stop is not absolute and can be limited by reasonable restrictions. 40 The

" See Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (distinguishing Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262
(3d Cir. 2010)). The court proclaimed, "Kelly is clearly distinguishable on its facts; a traffic stop
is worlds apart from an arrest on the Boston Common in the circumstances alleged." Id. Even
the Supreme Court has taken notice and stressed the danger of traffic stops. See Arizona v.
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (recognizing uniquely dangerous nature of traffic stops).
36 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 84 (cautioning right to film may be subject to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions). However, the court went no further by stating, "[w]e have no occasion
to explore those limits here ... " Id. Indeed, the court went on to state that Glik's conduct fell
"well within the bounds of the Constitution' s protections." (emphasis added). Id.
37 Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (stating issue before
court).
38 See id. The court explained "since the officers accept [Gericke's] version [of the facts] in
order to test the immunity issue, we, in turn, accept interlocutory jurisdiction to decide the
question on Gericke's 'best case,' which portrays compliance with all police orders." Id. (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In a footnote at the end of the case, the court suggested
that the officers could be entitled to qualified immunity if a fact-finder were to find that Sergeant
Kelley had in fact ordered Gericke to leave the area or stop filming. See id at 10 n. 13. However,
the defendants ultimately settled with Gericke for $57,500, so this potentially interesting issue
never arose. See Danielle Keeton-Olsen, Recent Settlement in Suit Over Arrest for Recording
Police Follows Growing Trend, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (June 16,
2014), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news/recent-settlement-suit-over-arrestrecording-police-follows-growing- (reporting Gericke's settlement).
39 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7. The court endorsed the idea that filming officers encourages
free and open discussions of government affairs by citizens and reasoned it is an important First
Amendment principle. See id. The right to record also aids in uncovering government abuse and
may have a beneficial effect on government functioning. See id.
40 See id. at 7-8 ("[R]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film may be
imposed when the circumstances justify them."). Essentially, the court reasoned that the right to
film remains unfettered unless a restriction is imposed on that right. See id. at 8. In giving
examples of restrictions, the court stated, "a restriction could take the form of a reasonable,
contemporaneous order from a police officer, or a preexisting statute, ordinance, regulation, or
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court explained certain traffic stops might present safety concerns to
officers and bystanders, and in these instances a police order to cease
recording could be justifiable even if it incidentally impacted a citizen's
First Amendment rights. 41 However, the court also cautioned that if the
police order was specifically and solely directed at the citizen's right to
film, then the officer would be justified only if he could reasonably
conclude that the citizen's recording was interfering, or about to interfere,
with the performance of his duties. 42 The court reasoned under Gericke's
version of the facts, Sergeant Kelley never issued an order to stop filming
or leave the area; therefore
Gericke's First Amendment right to film the
43
stop remained unfettered.
The court then proceeded to analyze whether the right to film the
traffic stop was clearly established at the time the stop occurred.4 4 Relying
on Glik, which had been decided two years prior, the court decided that
Gericke had a clearly established right to film the stop. 45 The court
explained that under Gericke's account of the facts no order was given to
leave the area or stop filming, and in the absence of such restrictions,
Gericke's right to film was clearly established.4 6 The court concluded by
stating that every reasonable officer would understand that charging
Gericke with illegal wiretapping in the absence of a reasonable restriction
on her right to record would violate the First Amendment and accordingly,
the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on their interlocutory
appeal .47
As recording devices of all types continue to spread throughout
society, citizens will continue to record police with increasing frequency
and the First Circuit should be commended for being on the forefront of

other published restriction with a legitimate governmental purpose." Id.
41 See id.at 8. The court explained, "[t]he circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly
when the detained individual is armed, might justify a safety measure for example, a command
that bystanders disperse that would incidentally impact an individual's exercise of the First
Amendment right to film."
Id. (suggesting ordering citizen to cease recording under
circumstances might be proper due to safety concerns).
42 See id. at 8. The court cautioned, "a police order that is specifically directed at the First
Amendment right to film police performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed
only if the officer can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to
interfere, with his duties." Id.
41 See id. at 8-9.
44 Gericke, 753 F.3d at 9.
41 See id. at 9-10.
46 See id. at 9.
47 See id. at 9-10.
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this complicated problem.48 In this case, the court's decision was proper

because Gericke was peacefully recording the officers from a safe distance,
and the officer did not order her to stop. 49 Although traffic stops can be
dangerous, there should not be a blanket prohibition on recording during
stops, and in a case like this a citizen clearly should have a First
Amendment right to record.50 Recording during traffic stops can benefit
citizens and police officers because it tends to discourage police
misconduct and false accusations by complainants 51and for these reasons
citizens should have a right to record in this context.
The court was also correct in asserting that the right to record
52
during traffic stops can be limited by reasonable restrictions.
Officers
frequently confront dangerous situations and they should have the ability to
order a citizen to stop recording for both personal and citizen safety.53
Going forward, officers will likely be able to stop citizens from recording
in situations where safety is at issue, and these orders could be properly
54
given during traffic stops or during other dangerous service calls.
Additionally, an officer can likely give a valid order to stop recording when
a citizen is interfering with the officer's duties. 55 While local practitioners

48

See Larsson, supra note 2, at 1 ("In recent years, the proliferation of miniature recording

devices and free video-sharing websites has led to a dramatic increase in citizen journalism. The
effect of this development is clearest in the context of civilian recordings of police activity,
particularly in instances of police misconduct.").
49 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 3 ("[U]nder Gericke's account, Kelley never asked her to stop
recording, and, once she pulled into the parking lot, he did not order her to leave the area.").
50 See id at 8 ("[An] individual's exercise of her First Amendment right to film police
activity carried out in public, including a traffic stop, necessarily remains unfettered unless and
until a reasonable restriction is imposed or in place.").
51 See id at 7 ("[Gjathering information about government officials in a form that can be
readily disseminated serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting the
free discussion of governmental affairs") (internal quotation marks omitted); Mishra, supra note
29, at 1554-55 (explaining how citizen recording deters police misconduct).
52 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 7 ("[R]easonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to film
may be imposed when the circumstances justify them.").
53 See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009) (acknowledging traffic stops may be
"especially fraught with danger to police officers"). The Court further stressed the risk of harm
during a stop is minimized if officers exercise complete authority over the situation. See id; see
also Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011) (remarking that "a traffic stop is worlds
apart from an arrest on ...
Boston Common').
14 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8 ("[T]he circumstances of some traffic stops, particularly when
the detained individual is armed, might justify a safety measure for example, a command that
bystanders disperse that would incidentally impact an individual's exercise of the First
Amendment right to film."). The court continued, "[s]uch an order, even when directed at a
person who is filming, may be appropriate for legitimate safety reasons." Id.
55 See id. at 8 ("[A] police order that is specifically directed at the FirstAmendment right to
film police performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer
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who represent officers should advise them of these two limitations on the
First Amendment right to record, they should be particularly cautious about
going too far because officers are still expected to exercise significant
restraint when dealing with citizens who are recording. 56 These exceptions
remain extremely narrow, and in many situations it appears courts will
continue to side with citizens by
holding there is a clearly established right
57
to record public police actions.
Qualified immunity remains an extremely important aspect of these
types of cases for plaintiffs and defense attorneys, and practitioners should
be prepared to craft arguments at both steps of the analysis. 58 At the first
step, practitioners should highlight or downplay the dangerousness of the
situation and level of interference with the officer because courts will likely
be disinclined to rule a citizen has an absolute right to record in dangerous
situations or in situations where they are belligerently interfering with the
officer. 59 The clearly established prong cuts both ways for plaintiffs and
defense counsel because for plaintiffs counsel there have now been two
First Circuit decisions that have upheld a citizen's right to record, and this
likely makes the right clearly established in a broad spectrum of different

can reasonably conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his
duties.") (emphasis added). However, it should be noted this does not mean officers can order
citizens to cease recording at the slightest sign of interference. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (stating First Amendment protects significant amount of verbal criticism
and challenge of police officers) (emphasis added).
56 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8 (agreeing police officers must tolerate substantial burdens
caused by citizens' exercise of First Amendment rights).
57 See id. ("[W]e have made clear that '[t]he same restraint demanded of police officers in
the face of 'provocative and challenging' speech, must be expected when they are merely the
subject of videotaping that memorializes, without impairing, their work in public spaces."'); see
also cases cited supra note 27 (listing many cases where right to record police has been
recognized).
58 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 5 (explaining that qualified immunity provides government
official with breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments); AVERY, RUDOVSKY &
BLUM, supra note 22, at § 3:4 (remarking that qualified immunity "presents thorny problems in
civil rights litigation"). The authors write that qualified immunity is "the most significant and
problematic defense to claims of civil rights violations." AVERY, RUDOVSKY & BLUM, supra
note 22, at, § 3:4.
59 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 8 (highlighting orders to stop recording are appropriate for safety
reasons or if officer is interfered with); see also Bleishv. Moriarity, No. 11-cv-162-LM, U.S Dist.
2012 WL 2752188, at *14 (D. N.H. July 9, 2012) (granting summary judgment when no jury
found defendant was arrested for exercising First Amendment rights). Although Bleish did not
involve qualified immunity, the court drew a stark contrast between the facts of its case and Glik.
Bleish, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 2752188, at *13. In the court's analysis, they reasoned a
demonstrator's actions in filming officers from one or two feet away and sticking her camera in a
police cruiser were vastly different from Glik's recording from a comfortable remove. See
Bleish, 2012 WL 2752188, at *14.
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situations.60 Conversely, practitioners representing officers should strive to
be highly fact specific and contrast the facts of their case with the prior
circuit precedents of Gericke and Glk .61
In Gericke v. Begin, the First Circuit faced the issue of a citizen's
right to record a police officer during a traffic stop. Ultimately, the court
arrived at a balanced holding that will benefit citizens and police, and
practitioners should pay careful attention to the implications of this
decision. Although the context of a traffic stop may be different from other
situations, citizens should maintain the right to record unless and until a
reasonable restriction has been put in place. Therefore, the First Circuit's
holding in Gericke v. Begin was the correct one.
John J Ryan

60 See Gericke, 753 F.3d at 9-10 (upholding right to film police officer during traffic stop);
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79 (upholding right to record officers during arrest on Boston Common); Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002) (cautioning that officials can be on notice of clearly
established law even in novel factual situations); see also Alderman, supra note 31, at 533
(expressing view that there is now "robust consensus" of persuasive authority from two circuit
courts that make right to record police officers clearly established).
61 See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (noting law will be clearly
established only if every officer knows he is violating right) (emphasis added); Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199-200 (2004) (explaining right must be clearly established in more
particularizedsense) (emphasis added). The court stated, "[w]e ...
ask whether, at the time of
Brosseau's actions, it was 'clearly established' in this more 'particularized sense' that she was
violating Haugen's Fourth Amendment right." Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199.

